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According to the trade-off theory of capital structure, each firm has a unique value-maximizing, or optimal, leverage ratio that
balances various benefits and costs of debt. An early version the theory involves the tax benefit of interest deductibility versus the
present value of bankruptcy costs (e.g., Kraus and Litzenberger, 1973). An extended version of the theory considers one additional
benefit and two additional costs. The additional benefit is that debt reduces agency costs of free cash flow (Jensen, 1986), while
additional costs are associated with: (i) the underinvestment (or debt overhang) problem for firms with profitable growth options
(henceforth GOs) (Myers, 1977); and (ii) the asset substitution problem (Galai and Masulis, 1976; Jensen and Meckling, 1976).
Empirical tests of the static trade-off theory involve cross-sectional regressions of leverage on variables that proxy for the
above factors. The most common proxies are the market-to-book assets ratio (MB), profitability, asset tangibility, firm size, and
median industry leverage. Overall, results are consistent with theory.1 However, three aspects of results from previous studies
prompt the investigation in this paper. First, the collective explanatory power of the traditional leverage determinants listed
above is modest (typical adjusted R2's are 20–25%), suggesting that either important leverage determinants are omitted or one or
more proxies are mis-measured. Second, the stand-alone explanatory power of MB is low despite indications from theory
(discussed later) that MB, as a proxy for GOs, should be an important determinant of optimal leverage. Third, among the
traditional proxies median industry leverage has the greatest explanatory power (e.g., Frank and Goyal, 2009; Lemmon et al.,
2008), even though this variable is simply a proxy for otherwise omitted leverage determinants that have a strong industry: +1 716 645 2131.
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French (2002), Flannery and Rangan (2006), Lemmon et al. (2008), and Frank and Goyal (2009).
r B.V. Open access under CC BY license.
183J.P. Ogden, S. Wu / Journal of Corporate Finance 23 (2013) 182–195component. Bradley et al. (1984) and Long and Malitz (1985) find that industries with high GOs tend to have low leverage, so we
suspect that the explanatory power of industry median leverage may be largely driven by inter-industry variation, and
intra-industry commonality, in GOs and thus MB (see also Miao, 2005; Rauh and Sufi, 2012).
Dynamic trade-off theory provides a potential explanation for observed deviations of actual leverage from optimal leverage.
Because capital structure adjustments are costly, it is impractical for a firm to make continuous adjustments to maintain optimal
leverage, so instead firms adjust when benefits exceed costs. Fischer et al. (1989) and others develop formal models of such
behavior. Empirical studies of financing activity, cited later, generally find that firms actively manage their leverage ratios to
maintain an optimal level of leverage.
However, a key test of dynamic trade-off theory involves speed of adjustment; the time required for the typical firm to
eliminate a deviation of actual leverage from optimal. Both Flannery and Rangan (2006) and Lemmon et al. (2008) estimate
speeds of adjustment, using (essentially) traditional proxies to estimate optimal leverage. Both studies find deviation half-lives of
about five years. Flannery and Rangan (2006) conclude: “With such a low estimated adjustment speed, convergence toward a
long-run target seems unlikely to explain much of the variation in firms' debt ratios” (p. 477). In both studies the authors then add
firm fixed effects, and find that half-lives fall dramatically. Flannery and Rangan (2006) interpret these results to indicate that a
stable factor is missing from traditional leverage regression models. Lemmon et al. (2008) argue that cross-sectional variation in
leverage has a substantial permanent component. However, results of adding firm fixed effects must be interpreted with caution:
Using simulated data, Hovakimian and Li (2011) find that adding firm fixed effects induces a substantial ‘look-ahead’ bias in
speeds of adjustment (see also Flannery and Hankins, 2013).
Thus, results of tests of both static and dynamic trade-off theories suggest that an important, stable factor is missing. The key
question is: What is the missing factor? Our review of theory leads us to the hypothesis that the missing factor is related to GOs.
Of course, empirical studies consistently include MB as a proxy for GOs. However, whereas extant studies enter MB linearly in
leverage regressions, we argue that the relationship is highly convex. If so, then using an appropriate convex transformation of MB
should yield stronger results in tests of both the static and dynamic trade-off theories.
We test this hypothesis using data on U.S. nonfinancial firms for the years 1971–2010. Evidence strongly supports the
hypothesis. Regarding static trade-off theory, we find that the relationship between market leverage and MB is indeed highly
convex, and in leverage regressions when we replace MB with an inverse exponential function of MB, exp−1 MB, adjusted R2
increases substantially. We also find that exp−1 MB partially subsumes the explanatory power of industry median leverage.
Regarding dynamic trade-off theory, results of leverage evolution analysis, speed-of-adjustment tests, and analysis of external
financing activity all indicate that using exp−1 MB rather than MB substantially improves the conformity of evidence to theory.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 develops our hypothesis about convexity in the relationship between leverage and
MB. Section 3 describes the data used in our analyses. Section 4 presents empirical results. Section 5 summarizes.
2. The leverage–MB relationship: is it convex?
We develop our hypothesis about convexity in the relationship between optimal leverage and MB by discussing how each of
the benefits and costs of debt recognized in the extant literature relate to GOs and thus to MB. Costs and benefits include not only
tax benefit and distress cost factors (e.g., Kraus and Litzenberger, 1973), but also a benefit from the reduction in agency costs of
free cash flow (Jensen, 1986) and costs associated with underinvestment (Myers, 1977) and asset substitution (Galai and Masulis,
1976; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). There is considerable debate in the literature about the relative sizes of these benefits and
costs. For instance, it is not clear that interest deductibility adds substantially to firm value (e.g., DeAngelo and Masulis, 1980;
Graham, 2000, 2003; Miller, 1977), or that expected costs of financial distress are substantial ex ante.2 On the other hand,
theoretical models and empirical studies indicate that the benefit of debt to reduce agency costs of free cash flow is substantial,3
while the presence of debt substantially exacerbates costs associated with underinvestment and asset substitution.4
We focus on how the balance of benefits and costs of debt shift as GOs increase (and thus MB increases), which will determine
the nature of the relationship between optimal leverage and MB. Our discussion is facilitated by reference to the basic framework
pioneered by Myers (1977); i.e., that the market value of a firm, V, can be broken down into two components; the market value of
“assets in place,” VA, and the market value of GOs, VG:2 See
3 See
and Mo
4 See
(2005),
MauerV ¼ VA þ VG: ð1ÞFirms vary in the relative sizes of VA and VG, ranging from pure “cash cows” for which VG = 0 to “growth firms” where VG
accounts for the bulk of V. Leverage may differentially affect the market values of assets in place (VA) and GOs (VG).
Trade-off theory suggests that cash cows have high optimal leverage. First, the tax benefit of debt, even if modest, is likely to be
important because the firm's means to create value are limited (i.e., a cash cow has no GOs). Second, distress costs may be
relatively low, as cash cows generally have stable profits, substantial tangible assets, and low MB (e.g., Korteweg, 2010; Leary andWarner (1977), Almeida and Philippon (2007), Korteweg (2010), and van Binsbergen et al. (2010).
Fama (1985), Jensen (1986), Smith (1990), Denis (1993), Palepu (1990), Stulz (1990), Jung et al. (1996), Parrino and Weisback (1999), Douglas (2002),
lina (2005).
Brennan and Schwartz (1984), Mello and Parsons (1992), Smith and Watts (1992), Leland (1998), Parrino and Weisbach (1999), Barclay and Smith
Barclay, Smith, and Morellec (2006), Eisdorfer (2008), Pawlina (2010), Hirth and Uhrig-Homburg (2010), Cai and Zhang (2011), and Hackbarth and
(2012).
184 J.P. Ogden, S. Wu / Journal of Corporate Finance 23 (2013) 182–195Michaely, 2011). Third, because cash cows have no GOs, the discipline of debt is valuable because potential agency costs of free
cash flow (overinvestment) are high. Fourth and fifth, potential agency costs of debt associated with both underinvestment and
asset substitution are minimal.
However, the balance of benefits versus costs of debt may shift dramatically as GOs increase. First, the tax benefit may fall,
at least temporarily, if the firm's current taxable income is low per se or because the firm can deduct substantial expenditures
(e.g., R&D) associated with ongoing investment in GOs. Second, distress costs will be higher for a growth firm than for a cash cow
because the growth firmwill lose the value of GOs in the event of distress or bankruptcy. Third, for a firm with substantial GOs the
discipline that debt provides to limit overinvestment is less necessary and thus less valuable. Fourth, dead-weight costs of debt
associated with underinvestment increase with GOs. Fifth and finally, as GOs increase agency costs associated with asset
substitution become more severe because it is easier for a growth firm to increase project risk.
In summary, while the arguments above are qualitative, they all point in the same direction: As GOs increase and thus MB
increases, optimal leverage decreases. Collectively, they suggest that optimal leverage may decrease dramatically as GOs increase,
and by extension the relationship between optimal leverage and MB may be highly convex. Yet empirical studies, including all of
the studies cited in footnote 1 and others, enter MB linearly in leverage regressions, and thereby implicitly assume that the
marginal net benefit of leverage is invariant to the level of MB. If the true relationship is convex, using a linear MB variable in the
leverage regression would result in: (i) biased estimates of optimal leverage that are related to MB; and (ii) lower explanatory
power for the MB variable.
While the shape of the leverage–MB relationship must ultimately be examined empirically, perspectives from models of the
leverage–MB relationship based on trade-off theory would also be instructive. Fortunately, two such models have been developed
recently, by Barclay, Smith and Morellec (2006) and Hackbarth and Mauer (2012).
BSM's model gauges the evolving trade-off, as GOs increase, between underinvestment costs of debt and free cash flow
benefits of debt (except in an appendix, BSM do not also incorporate tax benefits and bankruptcy costs associated with debt).
Holding assets in place constant as GOs increase, BSM find that optimal book leverage decreases as GOs increase. In other words,
the debt capacity of GOs is negative. This occurs because, as GOs increase, simultaneously underinvestment costs of debt increase
and free cash flow benefits of debt fall. They also document empirical evidence consistent with their model; i.e., they find that
book leverage is negatively related to MB.
BSM's analysis suggests that the relationship between optimal market leverage and MB is highly convex. Unfortunately, their
paper does not provide quantitative estimates of this relationship, so we develop a depiction here. Fig. 1 illustrates the
relationship between optimal market leverage and MB suggested by BSM's analysis. To generate values in the figure, we begin
with a cash cow with BA = 100, where BA is the book value of the firm's assets in place. In its unlevered state VAU = 100, where VAU
is the market value of the firm's unlevered assets in place. Thus, MB = VAU/BA = 1. The firm's optimal leverage involves debt with
a (market and book) value of D = 50, and in the levered state the market value of the firm's assets in place is VAL = 105, where the
increment of 5 (i.e., 5% of VAU) represents the net benefit of debt based on estimates in Korteweg (2010). Hence, at optimal
leverage MB = VAL/BA = 1.05 and market leverage is D/VAL = 50/105 = 0.476 = 47.6%. We then convert the cash cow into a
growth firm by adding VG to firm value while maintaining D = 50 and VAL = 105; i.e., GOs have zero debt capacity. Optimal
market leverage is then D/[VAL + VG], and MB = [VAL + VG]/BA. The relationship between optimal market leverage and MB can
then be plotted using points generated by varying VG.
The curve in Fig. 1 shows that the relationship between optimal market leverage and MB is highly convex. Moreover, since
BSM find that GOs actually have negative debt capacity, the curve understates the impact of GOs on optimal market leverage. The
shaded region below the curve represents cases in which GOs have negative debt capacity.0
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Fig. 1. Optimal market leverage–MB relationship if GOs have zero or negative debt capacity. The curve shows the relationship between optimal leverage andMB if
GOs have zero debt capacity. The shaded region below the curve represents cases in which GOs have negative debt capacity.
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associated with debt; however, their main focus is on stockholder–bondholder conflicts over the timing and financing of
investment, which can distort investment and optimal leverage. Using empirically-relevant parameter values in the model, in the
absence of agency costs optimal market leverage is 54%. In the presence of agency costs, H&M find that optimal market leverage is
always negatively related to Tobin's (1969) Q ratio (comparable to MB), and can be as low as 12% for a firm with a Tobin's Q value
of 1.54 (see their Table 1). Their model reflects key trade-offs discussed earlier, as they “… observe that the agency cost of debt
decreases as the growth option component of firm value increases, since the optimal debt level tends to be lower” (p.767). In
addition, H&M point out that the negative leverage–Q relationship occurs in part because having the option to issue debt in the
future decreases the optimal amount to issue today; i.e., firms with GOs optimally retain financial flexibility.
3. Data and variables
3.1. Sample
The universe of firms from which we draw our sample includes all U.S.-incorporated, publicly traded NYSE, AMEX, and
NASDAQ firms on the COMPUSTAT annual database for fiscal years 1971–2010. We exclude financial firms (SIC code values
6000–6999).5 We also delete (a) unseasoned firms by requiring that a firm has accounting andmarket data for fiscal year t − 1 as
well as fiscal year t; (b) distressed firms, where distress is defined as a year-end t − 1 share price less than $1 or year-end t − 1
MB value (defined below) less than 0.75; and (c) firms with year t external financing exceeding 100% of year-end t − 1 total
assets. Our final sample includes 125,574 firm-year observations.
3.2. Variables
Below we define and briefly discuss the variables use in the analyses. We divide them into three categories: leverage
measures; determinants of optimal leverage; and measures of financing activity.
3.2.1. Leverage measures
Most of our analysis is conducted using market leverage, though we also conduct some analysis of book leverage. Firm i's
year-end t market leverage is denoted as LEVi,t, and is calculated as (LTDi,t + DCLi,t) / (TAi,t − BEVi,t + MEVi,t), where LTDi,t is the
long-term debt, DCLi,t is the debt in current liabilities, TAi,t is the total assets, and BEVi,t and MEVi,t are the book and market equity
values, respectively. Year-end t book leverage is denoted as LEVbki,t and calculated as (LTDi,t + DCLi,t) / TAi,t. Both LEVi,t, and
LEVbki,t are expressed in percent.
3.2.2. Determinants of leverage
All leverage determinants are defined as year-end t − 1 values to emphasize that, consistent with previous studies, lagged
values of these variables should be used to explain year-end t values of market (or book) leverage. We calculate three alternative
MB-related measures to capture the effect of GOs on leverage. The first is the familiar linear measure. The year-end t − 1 value of
this measure is calculated as (TAi,t − 1 − BEVi,t − 1 + MEVi,t − 1) / TAi,t − 1, winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels, and denoted as
MBi,t − 1. The second and third measures are designed to capture the hypothesized convex relationship between optimal leverage
and MB. The second measure is the natural log of MBi,t − 1, denoted as lnMBi,t − 1. The third is the inverse exponential function of
MBi,t − 1 (i.e., exp−MBi;t−1), denoted as exp−1MBi,t − 1. Note that because the third measure is an inverse transformation of MBi,t − 1,
we expect a positive relationship between LEVi,t (or LEVbki,t) and exp−1 MBi,t − 1.
Trade-off theory suggests that more profitable firms have higher optimal leverage, though a consistent anomaly in leverage
regressions is that the coefficient of recent profitability is negative rather than positive. Our measure of profitability is the ratio of
year t − 1 earnings before interest and taxes to TAi,t − 1, denoted as EBITi,t − 1. EBITi,t − 1 is winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels
and expressed in percent. Firms with more tangible assets have higher optimal leverage because tangible assets serve as
collateral, which mitigates both financial distress costs and agency costs of debt (e.g., Stulz and Johnson, 1985). We measure asset
tangibility as the year-end t − 1 ratio of net PP&Ei,t − 1 to TAi,t − 1, denoted as TANGi,t − 1. TANGi,t − 1 is winsorized at the 1% and
99% levels and expressed in percent. Larger firms are generally more profitable and have lower failure risk, so optimal leverage
should increase with firm size. We measure firm size as the natural log of GDP-deflated total assets at year-end t − 1, and denote
this variable as SIZEi,t − 1.
For each firm-year i,t, industry median market leverage is calculated as the median value of lagged market leverage, LEVi,t − 1,
for all other firms in firm i's industry, where industry is defined using the Fama–French 38 industry classification.6 This variable is
denoted as LEV(IND)i,t − 1. We also calculate industry median book leverage in the same way, denoting this variable as
LEVbk(IND)i,t − 1.5 Standard Industry Classiﬁcation (SIC) code values are available in COMPUSTAT only after 1987, so we use SIC code values from the Center for Research in
Security Prices (CRSP) monthly database, using the COMPUSTAT SIC code value only if the CRSP value is missing.
6 SIC code ranges deﬁning the 38 industries are taken from Ken French's website. We obtain similar results throughout our analyses by alternately deﬁning
industries using 2- or 3-digit SIC codes, and whether we calculate industry median market leverage using annual or full-sample values of LEVi,t − 1.
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As part of our empirical analysis of the dynamic version of the trade-off theory, we test whether firms actively respond to
deviations of actual from optimal leverage by subsequently issuing or retiring debt or equity. For this analysis we use data from
cash flow statements to calculate net debt issues and net equity issues. The year t change in debt is calculated as long-term debt
issuance less long-term debt reduction plus the change in the current portion of long-term debt, and is denoted as ΔDi,t. The year t
change in equity is calculated as the sale of common and preferred stock minus purchase of common and preferred stock, and is
denoted as ΔEi,t. Both ΔDi,t and ΔEi,t are scaled by TAi,t − 1 and expressed in percent.
4. Empirical results
4.1. Summary statistics and correlations
Table 1 provides summary statistics and correlations for the primary variables used in our analysis. Panel A shows means,
medians, and standard deviations. Notably, the mean value (median; std. dev.) of LEVi,t is 26.04% (20.36%; 23.89%), while the
mean value (median; std. dev.) of MBi,t − 1 is 1.71 (1.32; 1.51).
Panel B shows correlations. The correlations of market leverage, LEVi,t, with the traditional leverage determinants MBi,t − 1,
EBITi,t − 1, TANGi,t − 1, SIZEi,t − 1, and LEV(IND)i,t − 1 are −0.27, −0.07, 0.33, 0.24, and 0.44, respectively. The signs are all
consistent with trade-off theory with the exception of EBITt − 1, where the anomalous negative correlation is consistent with
previous studies. Correlations involvingMB are consistent with our hypothesis. Specifically, the correlations of LEVi,t with lnMBi,t − 1 and
exp−1 MBi,t − 1, −0.53 and 0.56, respectively, are substantially larger in size than the correlation of LEVi,t with MBi,t − 1 (−0.27),
indicating that the relationship between leverage andMB is convex. In addition, correlations of LEV(IND)i,t − 1with lnMBi,t − 1 and exp−1
MBi,t − 1, −0.40 and 0.44, respectively, are larger in size than the correlation of LEV(IND)i,t − 1 with MBi,t − 1, −0.20. While all three
correlations suggest that the information contained in industry median market leverage is related to MB, the correlations for the
transformed MB variables indicate that this relationship is fairly strong.
Finally, we briefly discuss correlations involving book leverage. Correlations of LEVbki,t with traditional determinants all have the
same signs as with LEVi,t, though they generally are smaller in size. Correlations of LEVbki,t with lnMBi,t − 1 and exp−1 MBi,t − 1,−0.31
and 0.32, respectively, are larger in size than the correlation of LEVbki,t withMBi,t − 1,−0.18. Thus, our hypothesis about convexity in the
relationship between leverage and MB is supported using book leverage as well.
4.2. Graphical depiction of the market leverage–MB relationship
Next we generate a graphical depiction of the shape of the relationship between market leverage and MB. We do so by sorting
observations into twentiles by MBi,t − 1, and then calculating the median values of LEVi,t and MBi,t − 1 for each twentile group.
Fig. 1 shows the plotting of median LEV against median MB. The convexity of the relationship is immediately apparent. Median
LEVi,t exceeds 40% only for twentiles in which median MBi,t − 1 is less than 1.05. Thereafter median LEVi,t falls monotonically and
steeply, to 19.90% when median MBi,t − 1 is 1.46, to 9.26% when median MBi,t − 1 is 2.10, and finally to only 1.37% for the highest
MBi,t − 1 twentile, where median MBi,t − 1 is 6.24.Table 1
Summary statistics and correlations. Panel A (Panel B) shows summary statistics (correlations) for variables in our dataset of U.S. nonfinancial firms, 1971–2010
(N = 125,574). LEVi,t (LEVbki,t) is market (book) leverage at year-end t. MBi,t − 1 is year-end t − 1 market-to-book assets ratio, and lnMBi,t − 1 (exp−1 MBi,t − 1)
is the natural log (inverse exponential) of MBi,t − 1. EBITi,t − 1 is the year t − 1 earnings before interest and taxes scaled by year-end t − 1 total assets, TAi,t − 1.
TANGi,t − 1 is the year-end t − 1 PP&E scaled by TAi,t − 1. SIZEi,t − 1 is the natural log of TAi,t − 1 adjusted by the GDP deflator. LEV(IND)i,t − 1 and LEVbk(IND)i,t − 1
are the median year-end t − 1 values of LEVi,t − 1 and LEVbki,t − 1, respectively, by industry (Fama–French 38 industries classification). MBi,t − 1, EBITi,t − 1, and
TANGi,t − 1 are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. Except for the MB-related variables and SIZEi,t − 1, variables are expressed in percent. In Panel B, correlation
standard errors are all less than 0.003.
LEVi,t LEVbki,t MBi,t − 1 lnMBi,t − 1 exp−1 MBit − 1 EBITi,t − 1 TANGi,t − 1 SIZEi,t − 1 LEV(IND)i,t − 1 LEVbk(IND)i,t − 1
Panel A: summary statistics
Mean 26.04 23.61 1.71 0.42 0.25 5.35 32.36 4.21 20.39 22.39
Median 20.36 22.28 1.32 0.28 0.27 8.54 26.57 4.05 18.81 22.28
Std. dev. 23.89 18.68 1.51 0.48 0.13 17.32 23.80 1.98 14.04 6.05
Panel B: correlations
LEVi,t 1.00
LEVbkit 0.84 1.00
MBi,t − 1 −0.27 −0.18 1.00
lnMBit − 1 −0.53 −0.31 0.63 1.00
exp−1 MBit − 1 0.56 0.32 −0.50 −0.95 1.00
EBITi,t − 1 −0.07 −0.06 −0.10 −0.03 −0.03 1.00
TANGi,t − 1 0.33 0.36 −0.14 −0.23 0.22 −0.05 1.00
SIZEi,t − 1 0.24 0.22 −0.17 −0.20 0.16 0.15 0.28 1.00
LEV(IND)i,t − 1 0.44 0.32 −0.20 −0.40 0.44 −0.02 0.44 0.22 1.00
LEVbk(IND)i,t − 1 0.37 0.31 −0.12 −0.25 0.28 −0.10 0.47 0.20 0.79 1.00
Linear: Adj. R² = 0.550
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Fig. 2.Median market leverage by twentiles of MB. Firm-year observations are sorted into 20 groups (twentiles) by year-end t − 1 market-to-book assets ratio,
MBt − 1. Median values of MBt − 1 and year t market leverage, LEVt, are then calculated for each group, and median LEVt is plotted against median MBt − 1. The
figure also shows results of OLS regressions of median LEVt on (a) median MBt − 1, (b) the natural log of median MBt − 1, and (c) an inverse exponential function
of median MBt − 1. Data is U.S. nonfinancial firms, 1971–2010 (N = 125,574).
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natural log of median MBi,t − 1, and (c) the inverse exponential function of median MBi,t − 1. The results are also displayed in
Fig. 2. Using median MBi,t − 1 as the regressor, the adjusted R2 is 0.550, or 55.0%. On one hand, this result indicates that MB is an
important determinant of market leverage (note, though, that this adjusted R2 is not directly comparable to the adjusted R2 from a
leverage regression using individual firm-year observations). On the other hand, differences between actual median LEVi,t and the
linear projection reveal that the regression produces substantial errors that are related to MB. Specifically, market leverage is
substantially underestimated for low-MB firms and is substantially overestimated for most high-MB firms. For instance, for actual
median MBi,t − 1 values of 1.01, 1.88, and 2.90, the actual median values of LEVi,t are 43.85%, 11.93%, and 4.87%, respectively, while
corresponding predicted median values are 32.91%, 24.56%, and 14.79%, respectively.
In contrast, the transformed MB variables both provide a much better statistical fit. The adjusted R2s for the natural log and
inverse-exponential transformations are 0.816 (81.6%) and 0.954 (95.4%), respectively. Between the two, the inverse exponential
is preferable because (a) adjusted R2 is higher, and (b) the inverse exponential does not produce negative predictions of median
LEVi,t for high values of median MBi,t − 1, whereas the natural log does (see projections shown in the figure). Based on these
results and results in Table 1, in the remainder of the paper we use exp−1 MBi,t − 1 to represent the convex relationship between
leverage and MB.4.3. Panel regressions of leverage
Next we conduct tests of static trade-off theory via panel regressions of leverage on lagged determinants. Results are displayed
in Table 2. Panels A and B show results of regressions of market leverage (LEVi,t) and book leverage (LEVbki,t), respectively.7 In
addition to the usual regression statistics, for each determinant we provide a measure of its economic significance, the product of
the slope coefficient and the standard deviation of the determinant.
We focus initially on results in Panel A. In regression Eq. (1), MBi,t − 1 is the sole regressor. Its coefficient is negative, as
expected, and is highly significant. However, the adjusted R2 is only 0.071, or 7.1% (comparable to the value of 0.07 (7%) reported
by Frank and Goyal, 2009), and the economic significance of MBi,t − 1,−3.8, is small in size compared to the standard deviation of
LEVi,t, 23.89.
Regression Eq. (2) includes all five traditional determinants; i.e., MBi,t − 1, EBITi,t − 1, TANGi,t − 1, SIZEi,t − 1, and LEV(IND)i,t − 1.
The coefficients of all determinants are reliable, and all have the expected sign except for EBITi,t − 1, which has the anomalous
negative sign. Based on both t-values and economic significance, LEV(IND)i,t − 1 is the most important determinant. Indeed,
economic significance is more than twice as large in size for LEV(IND)i,t − 1, 7.7, as for any other determinant, including MBi,t − 1
(−2.5). Driven largely by LEV(IND)i,t − 1, the adjusted R2 for this regression is 0.256 (25.6%), similar to values in previous studies
that use the same or similar determinants.7 We obtain similar results (untabulated) using Fama and MacBeth (1973) methodology.
Table 2
Panel regressions of leverage. Panel A (Panel B) shows results of OLS panel regressions of market (book) leverage (LEVi,t (LEVbki,t)). Independent variables are
defined in Table 1. LEV(IND)i,t − 1 (LEVbk(IND)i,t − 1) is a regressor in Panel A (Panel B). Firm fixed effects are included as indicated. t-Values, cluster adjusted at
the firm level except in fixed-effect regressions, are shown in italics. Economic significance, the product of the slope coefficient and the standard deviation of the
determinant, is shown in bold type. Data is U.S. nonfinancial firms, 1971–2010 (N = 125,574). Significance indicators: *** (1%); ** (5%); and * (10%).
Independent variables Firm fixed
effects?
Adj. R2
or GLM R2
Regr. Eq. Intercept MBi, t − 1 exp−1 MBi,t − 1 EBITi, t − 1 TANGi,t − 1 SIZEi,t − 1 LEV(IND)i,t − 1 or
LEVbk(IND)i,t − 1
Panel A: dependent variable is market leverage (LEVi,t)
1 30.836***
45.77
−2.536***
−7.43 −3.8
No 0.071
2 8.355***
10.33
−1.641***
−6.97 −2.5
−0.131***
−18.34 −2.3
0.128***
15.59 3.0
1.474***
16.66 2.9
0.548***
38.87 7.7
No 0.267
3 1.299***
9.20
100.448***
110.95 13.5
No 0.317
4 −8.512***
−33.36
78.975***
81.72 10.6
−0.089***
−18.26 −1.5
0.126***
18.54 3.0
1.355***
19.26 2.7
0.284***
25.47 4.0
No 0.397
5 −0.553***
−25.28 −0.8
−0.175***
−47.83 −3.0
0.106***
25.30 2.5
3.155***
58.57 6.2
0.379***
66.12 5.3
Yes 0.715
6 42.024***
91.83 5.6
−0.102***
−28.09 −1.8
0.095***
23.46 2.3
2.594***
49.68 5.1
0.246***
42.75 3.5
Yes 0.733
Panel B: dependent variable is book leverage (LEVbki,t)
7 4.702*** 7.71 −0.877***
−6.65 −1.3
−0.069***
−12.06 −1.2
0.189***
−12.06 4.5
1.058***
14.91 2.1
0.463***
22.44 2.8
No 0.183
8 −1.332***
−3.21
29.963***
38.28 4.0
−0.053***
−10.27 −0.9
0.180***
26.82 4.3
1.009***
14.96 2.0
0.347***
17.57 2.1
No 0.212
188 J.P. Ogden, S. Wu / Journal of Corporate Finance 23 (2013) 182–195In regression Eq. (3) exp−1 MBi,t − 1 is the sole regressor. The slope coefficient is positive, as expected, and reliable.
Importantly, both the t-value and economic significance of exp−1 MBi,t − 1, 110.95 and 13.5, respectively, are far larger in size
than corresponding values for any of the determinants in Eqs. (1) and (2), including LEV(IND)i,t − 1. Moreover, adjusted R2 is
higher in Eq. (3), 0.317 (31.7%), than in Eq. (2), 0.267 (26.7%), even though the latter includes all five traditional determinants.
These results strongly support our hypothesis that the relationship between optimal leverage and MB is convex.
When we add the other four traditional determinants to form regression Eq. (4), adjusted R2 increases by 8.0 percentage
points to 39.7%, which is roughly 50% higher than the adjusted R2 for Eq. (2), 26.7%.
Note, though, that the increase is less than half the 19.6 percentage point increase in adjusted R2 that results when these four
determinants are added to MBi,t − 1 to form Eq. (2) from Eq. (1). One reason for the discrepancy is that the slope, t-value, and
economic significance of LEV(IND)i,t − 1 are allmuch smaller in Eq. (4), 0.284, 25.47, and 4.0, respectively, than in Eq. (2), 0.548, 38.87,
and 7.7, respectively; i.e., exp−1 MBi,t − 1 largely subsumes LEV(IND)i,t − 1. In other words, LEV(IND)i,t − 1 appears to contain
information about the effect of MB on optimalmarket leverage at the firm level, and this information is better captured directly using
exp−1MBi,t − 1 thanMBi,t − 1. From another perspective, whereas Eqs. (1) and (2) suggest thatMB is a relativelyweak determinant of
market leverage while the other four traditional determinants collectively are strong, Eqs. (3) and (4) indicate the opposite.
The final regressions in Panel A, regression Eq. (5) and (6), include firm fixed effects. Regression Eq. (5) includes the five
traditional determinants as explicit regressors, while regression Eq. (6) is formed by replacing MBi,t − 1 with exp−1 MBi,t − 1. In
both regressions, adding firm fixed effects generally reduces the size of the coefficients of the explicit determinants, though all
coefficients remain reliable and each has the same sign as in corresponding regressions without firm fixed effects, regression
Eqs. (2) and (4). The GLM R2s for Eqs. (5) and (6), 71.5% and 73.3%, respectively, are substantially higher than the corresponding
OLS adjusted R2s for Eqs. (2) and (4), 26.7% and 39.7%, respectively. As such, the results are consistent with Flannery and Rangan
(2006) and Lemmon et al. (2008).
However, we make two important points regarding the fixed-effect results. First, the increment in R2 from adding firm fixed
effects is substantially smaller when exp−1 MBi,t − 1 is included, 33.6% (=73.3% − 39.7%), than when MBi,t − 1 is included, 44.8%
(=71.5% − 26.7%). This difference suggests that, relative to the traditional regression, using exp−1 MBi,t − 1 helps us to capture
part of Flannery and Rangan's (2006) ‘missing stable factor’ or Lemmon et al.'s (2008) ‘permanent component.’ Second, we
note Hovakimian and Li's (2011) caveat that results involving firm fixed effects should be interpreted with caution because they
entail substantial look-ahead bias.
Finally, we briefly discuss results of regressions of book leverage, LEVbki,t, shown in Panel B. Regression Eq. (6) includes the
five traditional determinants, while regression Eq. (6) is formed by replacing MBi,t − 1 with exp−1 MBi,t − 1. In both regressions
the coefficients of all regressors are reliable and have the same sign as in the market leverage regressions in Panel A. Notable
differences are that the sizes of the coefficients, as well as the adjusted R2s, are generally smaller in Panel B than in Panel A.
Regarding our hypothesis about the convexity of the leverage–MB relationship, results in Panel B are qualitatively similar to those
in Panel A, though quantitatively they are less impressive. Specifically, t-value and economic significance are both substantially
larger in size for exp−1 MBi,t − 1, 29.963 and 4.0, respectively, than for MBi,t − 1,−6.65 and−1.3, respectively, and adjusted R2 is
189J.P. Ogden, S. Wu / Journal of Corporate Finance 23 (2013) 182–195higher for Eq. (8), 21.2%, than for Eq. (7), 18.3%. We also note that the negative (positive) sign of the coefficient of MBi,t − 1 (exp−1
MBi,t − 1) in Panel B provides critical support for Barclay, Smith and Morellec's (2006) argument that GOs have negative debt
capacity.
In summary, the results in Table 2 indicate that, in regressions of market (or book) leverage, performance is substantially
enhanced when exp−1 MBi,t − 1, rather than MBi,t − 1, is used to represent the effect of GOs on optimal leverage. In the remainder
of the paper we conduct tests to determine whether dynamic trade-off theory is also better supported if exp−1 MBi,t − 1, rather
than MBi,t − 1 is used to estimate optimal leverage. For the purpose of these tests, we will compare results using two alternative
models of optimal leverage. The first we call the traditional model, represented in Table 2 by the variables included in regression
Eq. (2). The second is the enhanced model, represented in Table 2 by the variables included in regression Eq. (4). The tests involve:
(a) leverage evolution analysis; (b) speed of adjustment analysis; and (c) analysis of external financing activity.
4.4. Leverage evolution analysis
Next we conduct leverage evolution analysis similar to Lemmon, Roberts and Zender (2008), which entails working in “event
time.”We begin by documenting the size of the ‘permanent component’ of market leverage. For each calendar year we sort firms
by market leverage (LEVi,t) into four portfolios by quartiles of market leverage. These portfolios are labeled ‘Low,’ ‘Medium,’
‘High,’ and ‘Very High.’ For each calendar year and portfolio we calculate: (i) mean market leverage in the portfolio formation
year, event year 0; and (ii) mean market leverage for survivors in subsequent event years 1 through 10. Finally, for each portfolio
and event year we calculate the average of market leverage means across the calendar years.
The results are displayed in Fig. 3 Panel A. For perspective, we add 95% confidence intervals for the Low and Very High market
leverage portfolio averages for each event year. For each portfolio and event year, average market leverage is very similar to the
corresponding value reported by LRZ (see their Fig. 1 Panel C, p. 1580). For the Low (Very High) quartile, event year 0 average
market leverage is 2.29% (59.49%), after which average market leverage rises (falls) gradually to 12.16% (42.21%) by event year
10. In event year 0 the difference of average market leverages for the Very High vs. Low portfolios is 57.20%; ten years later A) Evolution of market leverage 
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Fig. 3. Average market leverage, MB, optimal market leverage, and deviation in event time. In event year 0, four portfolios, ‘Low,’ ‘Medium,’ ‘High,’ and ‘Very High,’
are formed by quartiles of market leverage (LEV). For each portfolio and event years 0–10, Panels A, B, C, and D show, respectively, time series means of portfolio
annual averages of LEV, MB, optimal leverage estimated alternatively using traditional and enhanced model determinants, LEVOPTtrad and LEVOPTenh, resp., and
the deviation of actual market leverage from enhanced optimal market leverage, DEVenh. Dotted and dashed lines, where present, are 95% confidence intervals
for the highest and lowest leverage portfolios, respectively. Data is U.S. nonfinancial firms, 1971–2010 (N = 125,574).
190 J.P. Ogden, S. Wu / Journal of Corporate Finance 23 (2013) 182–195slightly more than half of this difference remains, 30.05%. Thus, the average market leverage difference exhibits substantial mean
reversion and yet also contains a substantial permanent component.
The question is whether the dynamics of actual market leverage displayed in Fig. 3 Panel A can be reconciled with dynamic
trade-off theory. Such reconciliation is conceivable. To see this, note that for each firm in event year 0 actual market leverage has
two components, optimal market leverage and the deviation of actual from optimal market leverage. Thus, firms sorted into the
Low (Very High) actual leverage portfolio will tend to be those with low (high) optimal leverage as well as firms with negative
(positive) deviations of actual vs. optimal market leverage. At the firm level deviations should be short-lived; however, optimal
leverage may be long-lived. Moreover, optimal leverage may also display mean reversion. For instance, many low-leverage
growth firms may evolve into high-leverage cash cows as their growth options are exercised over time (see also Flannery and
Rangan, 2006; Hovakimian et al., 2001). Consequently, in order to interpret the evidence in Fig. 3 Panel A we also need to examine
the dynamics of optimal leverage.
For our initial analysis of optimal leverage dynamics, we examine the dynamics of MB for the focal portfolios because our
hypothesis is that MB, as a gauge of GOs, is an important determinant of optimal market leverage. If so, then event-time average
values of MB should display dynamics similar to that of market leverage shown in Fig. 3 Panel A, including (a) large initial
differences, (b) partial mean reversion, and (c) a substantial permanent component. We calculate event-time average values of
MBt − 1 for each market leverage portfolio and event year using the same procedure as described above for market leverage.
Results are shown in Fig. 3 Panel B. For the Low (Very High) market leverage portfolio, event year 0 average MB is 2.69 (1.05),
after which average MB falls (rises) gradually to 2.04 (1.24) in event year 10. The initial difference in average MB between these
extreme portfolios is 1.64, and ten years later roughly half of this difference remains, 0.80. Thus, as expected the dynamics of
average MB closely corresponds to the dynamics of mean market leverage.
Next we examine the dynamics of optimal leverage in event time. Initially, for each firm-year i,t we estimate optimal market
leverage using the following two-step procedure. First, each year t we estimate the cross-sectional regression Eq. (2) using all
year t observations:LEVi;t ¼ βtXi;t−1 þ εi;t; ð2Þ
Xi,t − 1 is the vector of lagged determinants, either traditional or enhanced, defined earlier, and βt is a coefficient vector.where
Second, we use the year t vector of estimated coefficients, bβt, to calculate a year t estimate of optimal market leverage for each firm
i, LEVOPTi,t:LEVOPTi;t ¼ bβtXi;t−1: ð3ÞEstimates obtained using determinants for the traditional and enhancedmodels are denoted as LEVOPTtradi,t and LEVOPTenhi,t,
respectively, though we henceforth omit the subscripts. Finally, we calculate event-time average values of LEVOPTtrad and
LEVOPTenh for each market leverage portfolio and event year using the same procedure as described above for market leverage.
The results are displayed in Fig. 3 Panel C. Average values of LEVOPTtrad (LEVOPTenh) are shown using gray-scale (black)
lines. Results of using traditional and enhanced determinants differ in two important respects. First, for the portfolio formation
year (event year 0), the range of average optimal leverage values, between the ‘Very High’ and ‘Low’ portfolios, is much greater
using enhanced determinants. Using the traditional determinants the range is 17.58% (from 17.92% for ‘Low’ to 35.50% for ‘Very
High’), whereas using enhanced determinants, the range is 27.18% (from 12.02% to 39.20%).
For the ‘Low’ portfolio, average optimal leverage is significantly lower using enhanced determinants (diff. = −5.90%;
t-value = −13.50), and for the ‘Very High’ portfolio, average optimal leverage is significantly higher using enhanced
determinants (diff. = 3.71%; t-value = 17.24). These results are consistent with the market leverage regression results in
Table 2, where we found that explanatory power is greater using enhanced determinants (led by exp−1 MBi,t − 1) than traditional
determinants.
The second important result in Panel C pertains to the difference in mean reversion behavior using traditional and enhanced
determinants. Average values of LEVOPT(enh) display partial mean reversion that is qualitatively consistent with the partial mean
reversion of market leverage shown in Panel A. Specifically, for the ‘Low’ portfolio average LEVOPT(enh) increases substantially by
6.97% from 12.02% in event year 0 to 18.99% in event year 10, and for the ‘Very High’ portfolio average LEVOPT(enh) decreases
slightly by 0.94% from 39.20% in event year 0 to 38.26% in event year 10. Consequently, the difference in average LEVOPT(enh)
between the extreme portfolios falls by 7.91% from 27.18% in event year 0 to 19.27% in event year 10. Thus, the results for
enhanced determinants indicate that average actualmarket leverage differences across the extreme portfolios should exhibit both
partial mean reversion and a permanent component because optimal leverage exhibits this dynamics.
In sharp contrast, average LEVOPT(trad) essentially exhibits no mean reversion. For the ‘Low’ portfolio average LEVOPT(trad)
increases modestly by 3.89% from 17.92% in event year 0 to 21.81% in event year 10. However, for the ‘Very High’ portfolio average
LEVOPT(trad) actually increasesmodestly, rather than decreases, by 1.32% from 35.50% in event year 0 to 36.82% in event year 10.
Thus, the difference in average LEVOPT(trad) between the extreme portfolios falls by only 2.57% from 17.58% in event year 0 to
15.01% in event year 10. In summary, we conclude that the market leverage dynamics shown in Fig. 3 Panel A better reconcile
with trade-off theory using enhanced model determinants of optimal leverage rather than traditional model determinants.
Table 3
Speed of adjustment toward optimal leverage. This table shows results of estimating the following partial adjustment model of market leverage:
LEVi;t ¼ 1−λð ÞLEVi;t−1 þ λβð ÞXi;t−1 þ δi;t ;
where LEVi,t and LEVi,t − 1 are market leverage values for firm i at year-end t and t − 1, respectively, Xi,t − 1 is a vector of lagged leverage determinants, β is a
coefficient vector, and λ is the speed of adjustment parameter. Traditional determinants, used in Panel A, include MB, EBIT, TANG, SIZE, and LEV(IND). Enhanced
determinants, used in Panel B, include exp−1 MB, EBIT, TANG, SIZE, and LEV(IND). Estimates in Panels A and B are generated in one step using GMM. Estimates in
Panel C are generated using traditional determinants with firm fixed effects. Shown are estimates of λ and βs for individual determinants; t-values are shown in
italics. Half-life is calculated as ln(0.5) / ln(1 − λ). Data is U.S. nonfinancial firms for 1971–2010 (N = 125,574); variables are defined in Table 1. Significance
indicators: *** (1%); ** (5%); and * (10%).
Panel A: traditional determinants Panel B: enhanced determinants Panel C: traditional determinants with
firm fixed effects
Estimate Half-life (years) Estimate Half-life (years) Estimate Half-life (years)
λ 0.142*** 61.20 4.53 0.247*** 34.39 2.44 0.416*** 230.79 1.29
MBi,t − 1 1.157*** 11.95 0.040** 2.19
exp−1 MBi,t − 1 50.541*** 33.52
EBITi,t − 1 0.058*** 5.19 −0.006 −0.72 −0.023*** −7.42
TANGi,t − 1 0.132*** 11.72 0.150*** 18.58 0.009*** 2.68
SIZEi,t − 1 2.640*** 29.23 1.258*** 16.75 1.236*** 27.40
LEV(IND)i,t − 1 0.526*** 29.34 0.267*** 20.00 0.080*** 16.27
R2 0.740 0.786 0.807
191J.P. Ogden, S. Wu / Journal of Corporate Finance 23 (2013) 182–195Finally, we analyze the dynamics of deviations of actual from optimal market leverage. LRZ argue that a well-specified leverage
regression model should produce two results regarding deviations (see p. 1584). First, the event-year 0 difference between
average deviations for Very High vs. Low portfolios should be much smaller than the corresponding difference of average market
leverage. Second, any difference in the average deviation across these extreme leverage portfolios should quickly disappear as the
effect of random initial shocks that caused the deviations dissipates. LRZ find that their optimal market leverage model, which
uses traditional determinants, largely fails on both counts. First, the event-year 0 average deviation difference for Very High vs.
Low portfolios is 49%, which is nearly as large as the difference in average market leverage across the extreme portfolios, 60%.
Second, LRZ find that the average deviations have substantial permanent component. Their Fig. 2 Panel C indicates that in event
year 10 the average deviation difference is still about 20%.8
To calculate deviations, we use optimal leverage estimates based on enhanced determinants. Thus, firm i's year t deviation,
denoted as DEVenhi,t, is calculated as:8 WeDEVenhi;t ¼ LEVi;t– LEVOPTenhi;t: ð4ÞWe calculate event-time average values of DEVenhi,t for each market leverage portfolio and event year using the same
procedure as described above for market leverage. Results are shown in Fig. 3 Panel D.
For the ‘Low’ and ‘Very High’ market leverage portfolios, the event-year 0 average deviations are −9.73% and 20.29%,
respectively, so the event-year 0 average deviation difference is 30.02%. This figure is only about half the event-year 0 difference of
average market leverages for the ‘Very High’ vs. ‘Low’ portfolios, 57.20%. Moreover, for the ‘Low’ (‘Very High’) portfolio, the
average deviation rises (falls) gradually to −6.83% (3.95%) by event year 10, so that in event year 10 the average deviation
difference is 10.78%, which is only about one-third of the event-year 0 average deviation difference (30.02%). Thus, on both counts
enhanced determinants produce results that are more supportive of the trade-off theory than those of LRZ, which, as noted
earlier, are generated using traditional determinants.
4.5. Speed of adjustment analysis
As noted earlier, results of speed of adjustment tests in previous studies do not strongly support dynamic trade-off theory.
Both Flannery and Rangan (2006) and LRZ report leverage deviation half-lives of about five years if firm fixed effects are excluded.
However, in both studies speed of adjustment is estimated using (essentially) traditional determinants of optimal leverage. Based
on the evidence presented thus far, we expect shorter half-lives if we use enhanced, rather than traditional, determinants. Our
reasoning is that traditional determinants include MBi,t − 1 which is, in effect, a noisy measure of the effect of MB on optimal
leverage and, as Flannery and Rangan (2006) show, adding noise to estimates of optimal leverage decreases (increases) speed of
adjustment (half-life). Using exp−1 MBi,t − 1 instead should reduce this noise and thus increase (decrease) speed of adjustment
(half-life).obtain results (untabulated) similar to those of LRZ using traditional determinants.
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adjustmLEVi;t ¼ 1−λð ÞLEVi;t−1 þ λβð ÞXi;t−1 þ δi;t; ð5Þ
LEVi,t and LEVi,t − 1 are firm i's market leverage at year-end t and year-end t − 1, respectively, Xi,t − 1 is a vector of eitherwhere
traditional or enhanced lagged optimal leverage determinants, β is a coefficient vector, and λ is the speed of adjustment
coefficient. As LRZ point out, pooled OLS estimation of Eq. (5) results in a downward-biased estimate of λ. Thus, we estimate all
coefficients in one step using GMM. We also estimate Eq. (5) using traditional determinants with firm fixed effects. Half-life is
calculated as ln(0.5) / ln(1 − λ).
Results are displayed in Table 3. Panels A and B show results of using the traditional and enhanced determinants, respectively,
while Panel C shows results of using traditional determinants with firm fixed effects. In Panel A, the estimate of λ is 0.142
(t-value = 61.20), implying a deviation half-life of 4.53 years. This result is therefore similar to results in Flannery and Rangan
(2006) and LRZ. Surprisingly, the coefficients of MBi,t − 1 and EBITi,t − 1 are reliably positive, as opposed to the negative signs of
both variables in regression Eq. (2) of Table 2. The coefficients of TANGi,t − 1, SIZEi,t − 1, and LEV(IND)i,t − 1, though, are reliably
positive as in Eq. (2) of Table 2. We interpret the anomalous positive sign of the coefficient of MBi,t − 1 as a further indication of
measurement error in this variable.9
Results of using enhanced determinants, shown in Panel B, differ markedly in two respects. First, the estimate of λ is much
higher, 0.247 (t-value = 34.39), implying a much shorter deviation half-life, 2.44 years. Second, the signs of the coefficients of
the leverage determinants all agree with corresponding results in regression Eq. (6) of Table 2, though here the coefficient of
EBITi,t − 1 is insignificant. Moreover, the coefficient of exp−1 MBi,t − 1 is reliably positive as expected, though its value in Panel B,
50.541 (t-value = 33.52) is considerably smaller than in Eq. (6) of Table 2, 78.975 (t-value = 81.72). The results in Panel B:
(a) are consistent with our prediction that using enhanced determinants of optimal leverage increases (decreases) speed of
adjustment (half-life); and (b) provide stronger support for dynamic trade-off theory.
In Panel C we find that, like Flannery and Rangan (2006) and LRZ, half-life estimates fall dramatically when firm fixed effects
are added. The estimate of λ is 0.416 (t-value = 230.79), implying a half-life of 1.29 years. These results are consistent with those
of Flannery and Rangan (2006) and LRZ when they include firm fixed effects. However, we note again Hovakimian and Li's (2011)
caveat that adding firm fixed effects imparts a substantial ‘look-ahead’ bias in speeds of adjustment.
4.6. Analysis of external ﬁnancing activity
Finally, we conduct tests to determine whether the external financing activity of individual firms (i.e., the issuance or
retirement of debt or equity) tends to offset deviations of actual from optimal market leverage in accordance with dynamic
trade-off theory. Evidence from previous tests of this type is generally consistent with theory (e.g., Hovakimian et al., 2001; Jung
et al., 1996; Leary and Roberts, 2005).
We are particularly interested in determining whether external financing activity is better explained by using enhanced,
rather than traditional, determinants of optimal leverage to estimate deviations. We expect that this will be the case because
enhanced determinants better explain both cross-sectional variation in market leverage (Table 2) and market leverage dynamics
(Fig. 3 and Table 3). Moreover, based on the results shown in Fig. 2 we expect that deviation estimates based on traditional
determinants will contain bias related to MB. Specifically, many firms with low (high) values of MBi,t − 1 will erroneously be
classified as over-levered (under-levered).
Our main test is designed as follows. We separate firm-year observations into subsamples by the sign of the year-end t − 1
deviation of actual market leverage from estimated optimal market leverage.We then calculate mean values of year t net debt and
net equity financing, ΔDt and ΔEt, respectively, for each subsample. ΔDt should be higher, and ΔEt should be lower, for the
under-levered subsample (negative deviation) than the over-levered subsample (positive deviation). Deviations are estimated
alternately using traditional and enhanced determinants. Deviations based on enhanced determinants, DEVenhi,t − 1, were
defined earlier, in Eq. (3). Deviations based on traditional determinants, denoted as DEVtradi,t − 1, are defined analogously.
Results are displayed in Table 4 Panel A. The left and right sides of the panel show results of using traditional and enhanced
determinants, respectively. Before analyzing financing activity variables, we examine statistics for other variables that can tell us
about the characteristics of the under- and over-levered subsamples. The first two rows show mean values of DEVtradi,t − 1 and
DEVenhi,t − 1, respectively, for negative- and positive-deviation subsamples, as well as the differences of these means. The
difference of the mean deviations (positive less negative) is much larger based on traditional determinants, 33.756%, than for
enhanced determinants, 25.726%. This result is consistent with results in Table 2 indicating that actual market leverage is better
explained using enhanced determinants than traditional determinants; i.e., deviations will tend to be smaller in size using
enhanced determinants.
The third and fourth rows show mean values of LEVi,t − 1 and MBi,t − 1, respectively. Mean values for these variables are
consistent with our prediction that deviations based on traditional determinants will contain MB-related bias. To see this, note
that for traditional determinants firms with negative deviations have very low mean lagged market leverage and high meannery and Rangan (2006) ﬁnd that the coefﬁcient of MB ﬂuctuates between negative and positive depending on the speciﬁcation of the speed of
ent model (see their Table 2).
Table 4
External financing activity in response to deviations from optimal leverage. Panel A shows mean values of external financing and related variables for subsamples
of firms defined by the sign of the deviation of actual from optimal market leverage, where optimal market leverage is estimated using either traditional
determinants (left side) or enhanced determinants (right side). Panel B shows mean values by deviations based on only traditional determinants, split by
whether the sign agrees with (left side) or disagrees with (right side) the sign based on enhanced determinants. Determinants are defined in Table 3. Test
variables include: (i) year-end t − 1 deviation of actual market leverage from optimal leverage, DEVtradi,t − 1 or DEVenhi,t − 1; (ii) year-end t − 1 market
leverage, LEVi,t − 1; (iii) year-end t − 1 market-to-book assets ratio, MBi,t − 1; (iv) year t net debt financing, ΔDi,t; and (v) year t net equity financing, ΔEi,t. Data is
U.S. nonfinancial firms, 1971–2010 (N = 125,574). t-Values, cluster adjusted at the firm level, are shown in italics. Significance indicators: *** (1%); ** (5%); and
* (10%).
Panel A: means by deviation sign for alternative determinants of optimal leverage (% except for MBi,t − 1)
Traditional determinants Enhanced determinants
Sign of DEVtradi,t − 1 Sign of DEVenhi,t − 1
Negative Positive Difference Negative Positive Difference
DEVtradi,t − 1 −14.629 19.127 33.756
DEVenhi,t − 1 −11.998 13.728 25.726
LEVi,t − 1 11.537 49.755 38.218*** 397.21 13.080 41.038 27.958*** 258.17
MBi,t − 1 2.155*** 1.412*** −0.743*** −50.80 1.872*** 1.915*** 0.043*** 2.99
ΔDi,t 3 729*** 0.900*** 10.94 −2.829*** −33.33 3.623*** 68.29 1.535*** 19.95 −2.088*** −25.39
ΔEi,t 2 919*** 37.36 1.794*** 37.90 −1.125*** −18.15 1.630*** 27.34 3.684*** 43.71 2.054*** 30.03
N 80,803 44,771 71,303 54,271
Panel B: means for traditional deviation sign by agreement status with enhanced (% except for MBi,t − 1)
Sign agrees with enhanced Sign disagrees with enhanced
Sign of DEVtradit − 1 Sign of DEVtradi,t − 1
Negative Positive Difference Negative Positive Difference
DEVtradi,t − 1 −15.989 20.884 36.873 −8.314 4.571 12.885
LEVi,t − 1 11.666 51.828 40.162*** 428.57 10.941 32.585 21.643*** 124.92
MBi,t − 1 1.861 1.339 −0.522*** −43.34 3.521 2.017 −1.503*** −20.98
ΔDi,t 3.759*** 76.33 0.798*** 9.78 −2.961*** −33.04 3.592*** 25.69 1 747*** 9.94 −1 844*** −8.21
ΔEi,t 1.658*** 38.35 1.861*** 45.37 0.203*** 3.40 8.768*** 50.03 1.235*** 10.00 −7.534*** −35.14
N 66,481 39,949 14,322 4,822
193J.P. Ogden, S. Wu / Journal of Corporate Finance 23 (2013) 182–195lagged MB, 11.537% and 2.155, respectively, while firms with positive deviation have very high mean lagged market leverage and
lowmean lagged MB, 49.755% and 1.412, respectively. Thus, the differences of the mean values of LEVi,t − 1 and MBi,t − 1 (positive
less negative) are 38.218% and −0.743, respectively. The corresponding differences based on enhanced determinants are much
smaller in size, 27.958% and 0.043, respectively.
If the results for traditional determinants do indeed reflect bias in deviation estimates, then this bias should also be reflected in
financing activity statistics, to which we now turn.
The fifth row shows mean values of ΔDt for the various subsamples. Based on both traditional and enhanced determinants,
results are consistent with theory; i.e., under-levered firms have reliably higher mean net debt financing than over-levered firms.
For traditional [enhanced] determinants, the difference of mean ΔDt for over- versus under-levered firms is −2.829%
(t-value = −33.33) [−2.088% (t-value = −25.39)]. However, results sharply contrast for net equity financing. Based on
traditional determinants mean ΔΕt is reliably higher for under-levered firms (2.919%; t-value = 37.36) than for over-levered
firms (1.794%; t-value = 37.90), and the difference is reliable (diff. = −1.125%; t-value = −18.15). These results appear to be
inconsistent with theory. Instead, though, they are consistent with our prediction of bias; i.e., using traditional determinants firms
with high (low) MB, which have low (high) true optimal leverage and are therefore relatively more (less) likely to issue equity
(Jung et al., 1996), will be erroneously classified as under- (over-) levered. This point is underscored with the results based on
enhanced determinants, where, as expected, ΔΕt is reliably lower for under-levered firms (1.630%; t-value = 27.34) than for
over-levered firms (3.684%; t-value = 43.71), and the difference is reliable (diff. = 2.054%; t-value = 30.03).
For an alternative perspective on the bias in leverage deviations based on traditional determinants, we initially sort the full
sample into two subsamples according to whether, for each firm-year, the sign of the deviation based on traditional determinants
agrees or disagrees with the sign of the deviation based on enhanced determinants. Then for each of these subsamples we sort
firms, as before, into two subsamples according to the deviation sign based on traditional determinants and calculate mean values
of the various variables. We expect that this procedure will be at least somewhat effective in isolating observations in which
deviation bias based on traditional determinants is most severe; i.e., observations in which the deviation signs disagree.
The results are displayed in Table 4 Panel B. The left side (right side) of the panel shows results for the sets of subsamples in
which the two models agree (disagree) in deviation sign. Results for the ‘signs agree’ subsamples basically reflect a melding of the
results based on traditional and enhanced determinants shown in Panel A, and are consistent with theory (i.e., with respect to
mean values of ΔDt and ΔΕt), so we do not discuss them further. For the ‘signs disagree’ subsamples, note initially that they
collectively constitute a substantial fraction, 15.25%, of the full sample (14,322 and 4822 firm-year observations for the under-
and over-levered subsamples, resp.).
194 J.P. Ogden, S. Wu / Journal of Corporate Finance 23 (2013) 182–195The difference of mean ΔDt for the over- vs. under-levered subsamples is−1.844% (t-value = −8.21), consistent with theory.
However, the difference of mean ΔΕt for the over- vs. under-levered subsamples is reliably negative rather than positive, and is
very large, −7.534% (t-value = −35.14). We attribute this anomalous result to bias because the mean value of MBi,t − 1 is
substantially higher for the under-levered subsample, 3.521, than the over-levered subsample, 2.017, and the difference,−1.503,
is reliable (t-value = −20.98). That is, using traditional determinants often results in the misclassification of high-MB (low-MB)
firms as under- (over-) levered.
5. Summary
Theory suggests a strong negative relationship between optimal market leverage and profitable growth options (GOs), and
therefore a strong negative relationship between leverage and the market-to-book assets ratio (MB), as a measure of GOs.
Empirically, however, the relationship is weak.
We test the hypothesis that the true relationship between optimal market leverage andMB is highly convex. Using data on U.S.
nonfinancial firms for 1971–2010, we initially find that the relationship is indeed highly convex, and that an inverse exponential
transformation of MB, exp−1 MB, provides a good fit for the relationship. When we replace MB in the traditional leverage
regression model with exp−1 MB, adjusted R2 increases substantially, and exp−1 MB partially subsumes industry median market
leverage, which is the strongest traditional determinant of leverage. Using exp−1 MB rather than MB also yields stronger results
in tests of dynamic trade-off theory. Specifically: (i) A substantial portion of the previously-documented ‘permanent’ component
of market leverage is eliminated; (ii) the half-life of deviations of actual leverage from optimal is substantially shorter; and
(iii) external financing activity is better explained, particularly as MB-related bias in estimates of deviations is reduced.
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